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Negligence-Res ipsa loquitur-Injuries From Failure of Parachute to
Open.-[Illinois] Plaintiff, an experienced parachute jumper, leaped from
a plane at a height of 2,500 feet. He carried two parachutes which had
been packed by defendant's licensed "rigger." Both parachutes failed to
open properly, and the plaintiff suffered injuries from the fall. In his com-
plaint he alleged that the defendant was negligent in not properly preparing,
folding and packing the parachute. The jury awarded him $5,000 and costs.
Held: There was sufficient evidence to support the allegations in the com-
plaint and the verdict for the plaintiff was proper. Jack Cope v. Air Asso-
ciates Inc., 283 II. App. 40 (1935).1
The court summarily refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
saying that it had no application where there is evidence of specific neg-
ligence. This statement is based upon the decision in O'Rourke v. Marshall
Field and Co. 2 In that case the plaintiff, a child of six years, was injured
in falling from a toy horse in the defendant's playroom. There was evi-
dence that the handle on the horse was loose, and the court said that where
specific negligence is shown, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.
The Illinois court has defined the doctrine in Feldman v. Chicago Ry. Co.3
to be: where a thing which has caused injury is shown to be under the
management of the party charged with negligence, and the accident is such
that in the ordinary course of events it would not have happened if those
who had the management had used proper care, the accident itself affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that it arose from want
of proper care by the party charged. The doctrine thus becomes a rule of
evidence which places the burden of explaining on the defendant after the
plaintiff has stated facts within the rule.
In the present case the doctrine would be applicable but for the limita-
tion placed upon it by the O'Rourke case, for the defendant had exclusive
control over the preparation of the parachute (as required by the rules of
the Bureau of Air Commerce of the United States Department of Commerce
which are in force in Illinois4), and it would undoubtedly have opened if it
had been properl, folded and packed. Had the plaintiff failed to substantiate
his allegations of negligence with the proper evidence the doctrine might
still be invoked to allow him recovery, for the court has held that an un-
successful attempt by the plaintiff to make out a case of specific negligence
does not prevent his relying on the doctrine when the case is within the
rule.5
1. Appeal dismissed by Supreme Court. See Chicago Herald & Examiner,
April 23, 1926.
2. 307 Il1. 197, 138 N. E. 625 (1923).
3. 289 Ill. 25. 124 N. E. 334 (1919). See also Brison v. St. Louis Transfer
Co., 155 Ill. App. 317 (1910) ; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 Ill. 260,
82 N. E. 232 (1907); Bolenback v. Bloomenthal, 341 II1. 539, 173 N. E. 670
(1930).
4. Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7-D, Dept. of Commerce, Air Commerce Regu-
lations, Parachute Supplement.
5. Galena & Chicago R. R. Co. v.. Yarwood, 17 Ill. 509 (1856); North
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In the instant case one would hardly criticize the result, but the court
seems to have disposed of a serious matter with extreme lightness; there is
no mention of any specific negligence of the defendant unless the broad
statement that the parachute was improperly prepared, folded and packed
satisfies that requirement. Inasmuch as the number of cases in the field
of aviation is rapidly increasing, it is fortunate that the court has not com-
pletely closed the door for the use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ir
this type of case. Thus, even under the instant decision, if one is injured
because of a faulty parachute, and is unable to show a specific act of negligence,
the doctrine may be invoked. However, it is regrettable that the court did
not take a definite stand in a positive manner and show what is necessary for
the application of the rule, as did the California court in Parker v. James
E. Granger, Inc.6
JOHN McNERNEY. 7
Negligence-Air Carriers-Death of Passenger in an Air Line Aircraft.
-[New York] Gentlemen of the Jury:' . A young man named Harry
Pinsley was killed in an airplane accident near Liberty, Sullivan County,
in this State, on June 9, 1934. He was at that time, as I recall the testi-
mony, twenty-six years of age, and had an expectancy of 38.11 years of
life according to Mortality Tables. Subsequent to his death Mr. Goodheart,
the plaintiff in this action, obtained letters of administration upon his estate,
and brings this action against the defendant, the American Airlines, Inc., to
recover damages for the death of this young man which, he says, was
caused by the negligence of the defendant. It appears that on the day
in question this young man became a passenger on one of the airplanes
owned and operated by the defendant. He boarded the plane over at New-
ark, New Jersey, and the plane left the airport about 4:03 that afternoon,
that is, three minutes after 4:00 o'clock. It was heard from again some
little distance north, or northwest of Newburgh, one-half hour later, at
4:33, and it was not heard of again until the airplane was found with its
nose imbedded in the side of a mountain 200 feet below the top, and the
trees along the side of the mountain and below the mountain for some dis-
tance with the tops, parts of them, cut off, parts of the wings of the air-
plane on the trees and the dead bodies of the occupants of the plane found.
There were four passengers on the plane, of which the plaintiff's intestate
was one, two pilots, that is, the regular pilot and a co-pilot, and a stewardess.
All seven were killed in this accident. The defendant says it was not neg-
ligent, that it used the care that was required by law, and that it did every-
thing that human foresight and ingenuity could have foreseen under the
circumstances of the case.
The mere fact that this young man was killed in the accident does not
entitle the plaintiff to a verdict at your hands. The young man's representa-
Chioago St. R. R. Co. v. Cotton, 140 I1. 486, 29 N. E. 899 (1892) ; Chicago City
If. 1f. Co. v. Carroll, 206 Ill. 318, 68 N. E. 1089 (1903).
6. 90 Cal. 475, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935), Comment (1936) 7 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 283.
7. Student, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. The following charge to the jury was made April 29, 1936, by Dodd, J.,In the case of Goodheart v. American Airlines, Inc., before the Superior Court
of New York, Nassau County. Copy of the charge to the jury furnished through
the courtesy of Pruitt and Grealis, Attorneys, of Chicago.
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tive here must prove by a fair preponderance of the believable evidence in
the case that his death was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and
that he himself was free from contributory negligence. All we know about
the case is that the young man boarded the plane on the afternoon in ques-
tion and that he was killed about an hour or so later. The defendant says
that it did everything that prudence and caution could have suggested to
prevent such an accident as this. It appears that the plaintiff was bound
for Buffalo, and that the direct route usually taken by these planes to that
point was by way of Scranton and Elmira, and then across to Buffalo. But
they had received weather reports that day; they were accustomed
to receive weather reports from time to time throughout the day,
and the officers of the company and the pilot had a conference before the
plane started and it was decided that because of weather conditions re-
ported to the officers of the company, or those in charge of the management
of this service, weather conditions were not to their liking, and they decided
to take what was known as the alternate route. That route was up over
the Hudson River to a point about twenty miles south of Albany, and then
to take a westerly course to their destination, stopping at the City of Syracuse
for fueling. They told us what inspections were made of these planes, what
the laws of the United States provided for inspection, and what the rules of
the company provided, and they say that this plane was inspected early that
morning and its equipment was found to be in good condition; that before
the pilot boarded the plane he himself looked over the plane, made an exam-
ination of the instruments, of all of. the equipment, the motor and instru-
ments that have been described here, and all this was done before going;
that he had the weather reports and he had a map with him to show the
route, and that everything that they could have done was done under the
circumstances.
What happened after he reported back to the port at Newark we do not
know. All we do know is that at 4:33 that afternoon he reported by- air
where he was, and the next thing he was to have reported again at 5:03 or
5:00 o'clock. sometime, then every half hour, I think the testimony is, his
position and what conditions were. They heard nothing from him at 5:00
or 5:30 or 6:00, and at 7:00 o'clock they became alarmed, sent a message
to the general manager of the concern who was in Washington, and a search
was started for this plane, and it was finally found on the 11th at the place
that we have heard.
The defendant in this case was a common carrier of passengers, and it
owed to this plaintiff's intestate, this young man who was killed, the highest
degree of care. It .was not the insurer of the safety of the passengers, but it
owed to them the highest degree of care, care in the selection of the airplane
itself, care in its proper equipment, care in the selection of the pilot who was
to operate it, and care to see that the motor and all of the working parts
of the airplane were in a proper and safe condition.
In this case we do not know what occurred, except that we do know that
the plane was destroyed and this plaintiff was killed. We have proof of an
accident resulting in the death of the plaintiff's intestate. Where in such a
case the accident cannot reasonably be accounted for except on a basis of
negligence, the defendant is called upon to explain the accident, and in the
absence of an explanation consistent with the exercise of due care the jury
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may find the defendant negligent. It may find a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff. It does not, however, relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving
negligence. That burden remains upon the plaintiff throughout the case
and does not shift, and he 'must prove this by a fair preponderance of the
evidence. Has the defendant overcome the presumption of negligence which
resulted from the occurrence of the accident? If it has, then you cannot
find the defendant negligent, you must find it free from negligence and your
verdict will be for the defendant, but if it has not overcome that presump-
tion then you may find a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Was the plaintiff's intestate free from contributory negligence? Did he
do everything that a reasonably prudent person could have done under the
circumstances? We do not know what happened in the airplane, and I do
not think that the defendant in this case urges the question of contributory
negligence, so it is not necessary for you to consider that, but you will
consider, gentlemen, whether or not the defendant was negligent under the
rules that I have laid down for your guidance. If you find the defendant
negligent, then your verdict of course must be for the plaintiff.
We have here, as I said, a young man twenty-six years of age, with
an expectancy of 38.11 years. He left him surviving a father, whose age
was fifty-eight. The father had an expectancy of 15.39 years. His mother
was forty-eight years of age, and she had an expectancy of 22.36 years.
What was the value of the life to those whom this young man left behind
him? It is a cold-blooded way to consider matters, but we have nothing else
that we can do. We cannot restore the life of the young man to his parents,
to his sister and brothers, and the only other thing that is left for us, if his
death was caused by the negligence of the defendant, is to award to those
who are left behind damages that they sustain by reason of his death.
Hence comes the question what in dollars and cents was his life worth to
his father, mother, brothers and sisters at the date of his death? There is
testimony here that after having been graduated from law school he never
practiced his profession, but he did go to work for a music concern, and
you heard the testimony as to what his duties were and as to his compensa-
tion. The plaintiff in this case, the administrator of the estate of the young
man says that he was in the employ of their company from 1932; that that
year he received in salary and bonus $3,825; in the year 1933 he received
in salary and bonus $8,500. In 1934 he was paid a salary of $400 a month.
His death occurred that year and he received no bonus, and all he received
from them during that time was the $400 a month. His father says that
he made allowances to him, sent him money every month and he told us
what it was. All of these things you will take into consideration, gentlemen,
if you find that the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
Come right down to the old question, what in dollars and cents was his
life worth to his next of kin on the day of his death? That is for you
to say from all of the evidence in the case.
You are the sole judges of the facts both on the question of negligence
and the question of damages, if you get to that point. You are not bound
by any statement of facts made by counsel or by myself, unless that state-
ment of fact agrees entirely with your recollection of, the testimony given
by the witnesses on the stand. The duty and responsibility of determining
where the truth lies is upon you, not upon counsel or upon myself. That
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is your part of this trial. The law you must take from me as I have given
it to you. That does not mean that I cannot commit error, make a mistake,
I am not infallible, it does not mean anything of the sort, but it means
just this, that if this case goes to an Appellate Court for review that Court
will assume, as it has the right to assume, that the jury followed the in-
structions of the Judge and determined for themselves, from the evidence in
the case, what are the facts, and to the facts as they found them to be applied
the law as given to them by him. So you see, if you do not follow my in-
structions you may do great and irreparable injury to either of the parties
to this litigation.
This is a Court of Justice. You and I are here to do exact justice, so
far as it is humanly possible to do it between the plaintiff on the one side
and the defendant on the other. Into our deliberations must enter no con-
sideration of sympathy, of charity, of bias or of prejudice, nor is this a place
for generosity. We have no right to be generous with other people's money,
but we must be just. If this man's death was caused by the negligence
of the defendant then we must award to his next of kin damages that are
fair and reasonable under all the circumstances of the case. And it is for you
to decide if you find that the defendant was negligent what lump sum will
compensate his next of kin for his death.
The fact that I am giving this case to you must not create in your mind
any idea that I have an opinion as to the facts in this case. It does not mean
that at all. It means that in my judgment there is a question of fact here
which must be passed upon by you gentlemen of the jury. I have no opinion
as to the facts. If I had and you knew what it was, it would be your solemn
duty to disregard that entirely, because the duty and responsibility of deter-
mining the facts is upon you. The same is true as to the rule of damages.
The fact that I have charged you on the subject of damages means just this,
that if you find the plaintiff was entitled to damages that is the rule you
must follow in fixing your award.
MR. UTERHART: I ask your Honor to charge the jury that the rule of
the highest degree of care extends to all the employees of the defendant,
who were connected with this flight including Hoibrook and the co-pilot.
THE COURT: Yes. If you so find that this accident was caused by the
negligence of any agent or servant of the defendant, then your verdict must
be for the plaintiff.
MR. LODER: May I call the 'Court's attention to the fact I believe in
this case there are only two next of kin, that is, father and mother.
THE COURT: Father and mother.
MR. LODER: You mentioned brother and sister.
THE COURT: I meant father and mother. Of course, we do not know
how long this man may have lived, he may have turned out to be the finest
son in the world, he may have turned out to be otherwise, we do not know.
The best we can do is use our own judgment in fixing the amount of -dam-
ages, if we find the plaintiff is entitled to them.
MR. UTERHART: I would ask your Honor to charge more specifically on
the question of contributory negligence.
THE COURT: I think that has been withdrawn from the case entirelyf
There is no claim of contributory negligence in this case?
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MR. LODER: We have no proof of it.
THE COURT: Take the case and do justice between the parties.
Verdict
THE FOREMAN: The jury say they find the defendant not guilty.
THE CLERK: You say you find a verdict in favor of the defendant?
MR. LODER: I presume the verdict should be rendered as a verdict in
favor of the defendant.
THE COURT: It is a defendant's verdict.
MR. UTERHART: I ask that the jury be. polled.
MR. UTERHART: I move to set aside the verdict upon the ground it is
against the law, against the evidence, against the weight thereof, and upon
all other grounds set forth in Section 549 of the Civil Practice Act.
THE COURT: Decision is reserved.
DIGESTS
Air Exhibitions-Personal Injuries-Conspiracy to Commit Illegal
Act by Members of State Fair Board-Violation of State Air Traffic
Rules.-[Iowa] In the conduct of the Iowa State Fair held over a 7 day
period in August of 1930, as one of the attractions and entertainments, the
State Fair Board entered into a contract with the Curtiss-Wright Exhibition
Corporation for aerial exhibition programs to be presented before the grand-
stand. On August 28th in pursuance of the terms of the contract, the em-
ployees of the Curtiss-Wright Company were stunting three planes over the
fairgrounds at an alleged height of less than 500 feet and within 300 feet
of each other, in violation of Sec. 8338-c7 and Sec. 8338-c8 of' the Iowa
statutes. Two of said airplanes collided and one crashed, striking several
guests in the crowd below and fatally injuring the plaintiff's decedent, Ver-
non F. De Votie. The fact situation in this case came before the same court
in the case of De Votie v. Iowa State Fair Board (216 Iowa 281). It was
there held that the Iowa State Fair Board, being an arm of the State, was
not suable. Plaintiff then filed an amended and substituted petition, alleging
generally the same facts, and claiming that the defendants, as individual
members of the State Fair Board, were guilty of conspiracy to do an illegal
act and were therefore liable personally to respond in damages. Defendant's
motion to strike the amended and substituted petition was sustained, where-
upon plaintiff excepted and appealed. Held: on appeal affirmed. Since the
State in its sovereign capacity was conducting the state fair, and since the
statutes (dealing with minimum altitudes and acrobatic flying, and commonly
considered a part of the state air traffic rules) which are made the basis
of the charge of conspiracy to do illegal acts do not expressly or by clear
intent apply to the State, then such statutory provisions are not applicable to
the State, and it cannot be said therefore that the State was a party to or
engaged in an illegal or unlawful act. Nor are the defendants as individual
members of the State Fair Board liable. The Fair Board being an agency
of the State, the members of the Board, while in the discharge of their duties
as such members, stand in the place of the State, and their action is the
action of the State. Plaintiff's amended and substituted petition and amend-
ment therefore did not show a cause of action against the defendant Board
or against them as individuals. R. G. De Votie, Administrator of the Estate
of Vernon F. De Votie, Deceased v. Charles E. Cameron, et al., - Iowa -,
265 N. W. 637. (Decided March 10, 1936, Supreme Court of Iowa.)
Constitutional Law-Application of Federal Air Traffic Rules.-[Fed-
eral] Per Curiam. The appeal from a decision of the Supreme Court of
California herein is dismissed for the want of jurisdiction. Section 237 (a),
Judicial Code, as amended by the Act of February 13, 1925 (43 Stat. 936,
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937). Treating the papers whereon the appeal was allowed as a petition
for a writ of certiorari, Section 237 (c), Judicial Code, as amended (43
Stat. 936, 938), certiorari is denied. Thomas J. Parker, Adm. v. James
Granger, Inc., and Tanner Motor Livery, 56 Sup. Ct. 958. (Decided June 1,
1936, United States Supreme Court). For a prior account of the issues in-
volved in this case, see 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 275, 283 (1936).
Insurance-Double Liability-Construction of "Engaging as a Pas-
senger or Otherwise in Aeronautic Expeditions" Exclusion Clause.-
[Federal] Insured held a life insurance policy with defendant in which, for
a separate premium, defendant agreed to pay double indemnity if death
resulted solely from bodily injuries caused directly by accidental means
"and shall not be the result of or be caused directly or indirectly...
by engaging as a passenger or otherwise in submarine or aeronautic expedi-
tions." The death of insured resulted under the following circumstances:
One Reed, a friend of Day's, brought a privately owned plane to Denver
some time before the accident. The plane was airworthy but neither it nor
Reed was licensed to carry passengers for hire. The exact status of the
pilot is not shown, although it appears that he had had some fifty hours
of flying experience. Reed took the insured up as a guest for a pleasure
flight over the airport and the outskirts of Denver one day when weather
conditions were favorable. The pilot made a simple loop and the plane
straightened out, then went into a spin and crashed, killing the insured.
The question in the case is whether or not those circumstances constituted
an aeronautic expedition to relieve the defendant from liability for the death
of insured. In the trial court judgment was entered for the defendant.
Held: on appeal, reversed. As 'words are ordinarily used, a pleasure trip
over an airport on a pleasant day is not an "expedition." The mythical
average man when offered such a policy would not think that an ordinary
airplane trip was excluded by the formidable words "submarine or aero-
nautic expeditions." If it were intended, when the policy was drafted and
offered for sale, to exclude from coverage every loss resulting from an
airplane trip or flight, counsel drafting the clause could have found language
less apt to mislead the buying public. In construing contracts words will be
given the meaning that common speech imports, and where reasonable men
might differ, an ambiguous phrase should be resolved in favor of the cus-
tomer who purchased the policy and not in favor of the company which
drafted it. Iva A. Day v. The Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
United States, 83 F. (2d) 147. (U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth
Circuit, decided April 7, 1936).
For a review of recent cases involving the construction of similar clauses
see article in this isssue, "Aeronautic Risk Exclusion in Life Insurance Con-
tracts," Fred M. Glass, 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 305; 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
143 (1936) (note by Fred M. Glass) ; and 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 626 (1935)
(note by William G. Karnes).
Negligence-Alleged Violation of Air Commerce Regulations Govern-
ing Use of Dual Controls in Airplane-Contributory Negligence-Res Ipsa
Loq'itur.-[South Dakota] Action was brought by plaintiff as adminis-
tratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Clarence Budgett, for the
recovery of damages resulting from the death of said decedent, claimed
to have been caused by the negligence of defendant in the operation of an
airplane in which decedent was riding. Defendant was engaged in the busi-
ness of selling airplanes, and for the purpose of demonstrating them to
prospective customers employed a licensed pilot, who was also in general
charge of defendant's airport. On March 31, 1931, said Clarence Budgett
and one Philip W. Schmidt, both licensed pilots themselves, went to said
airport as prospective buyers of an airplane and made arrangements for the
demonstration of a certain airplane, a "Travelair OX5," having two cock-
pits equipped with dual controls, the front cockpit accommodating two
passengers and the rear cockpit one. Budgett and his companion occupied
the front cockpit and defendant's pilot in control occupied the rear. The
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controls in both cockpits were hooked up but the passengers, being licensed
pilots, undoubtedly understood the danger of interfering with the dual
controls. Shortly after the take-off and two or three turns about the field,
the plane stalled and crashed, the two passengers being killed almost in-
stantly, although the pilot was not seriously injured.
Plaintiff introduced in evidence Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7 containing
the following air commerce regulation: "Supplies and equipment . . . (B)
in licensed aircraft the controls shall be so constructed or arranged as to
prevent passenger or cargo from interfering with the course of flight of the
aircraft"; and she claimed that in using the ship with the dual controls
hooked up while the plane was being used for demonstration purposes, the
defendant violated the federal rule set out and was therefore negligent,
and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Plaintiff
also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant claimed that the
passengers, being experienced pilots, were contributorily negligent in riding
in the cockpit with the dual controls hooked up. The case was tried to a jury
and at the close of the evidence defendant moved for a directed verdict,
which motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
Defendant then made a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, which
was granted. Held: on appeal, affirmed. Plaintiff failed to sustain the burden
of proof necessary for recovery. The Court found it unnecessary to deter-
mine which, if either of the parties was negligent, because, however negligent
decedent and his companion may have been in riding in the cockpit with
the dual controls hooked up, it is not shown that such negligence con-
tributed in any way or to any extent to the accident. They may have inter-
fered with the controls, but there is no evidence to show that they did so.
On the other hand the pilot may have been negligent, but the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur cannot be applied because there is not more probability
that the accident was caused by negligence on the part of the defendant than
on the part of decedent or his companion. Kathryn Budgett, as Adminis-
tratrix of the Estate of Clarence Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., a Corpora-
tion, - S. D. -, 266 N. W. 253. (South Dakota Supreme Court, decided
March 30, 1936).
Negligence-Evidence-Death of Mechanic from Blow of Propeller
Blade.-[New Jersey] Plaintiff's intestate, Vernie E. Moon, met his death
while engaged in the act of aiding the defendant Donald Lewis to start the
motor of an aeroplane. Moon was an employee at the airport where the
accident occurred, and it was part of his duty to aid the flyers in starting
the motors of the various airplanes. The defendant, Donald Lewis, a student
flyer, was sitting in the pilot's seat in the cockpit of his father's (the de-
fendant Nathan E. Lewis) airplane awaiting the arrival of the flying instruc-
tor, and in the meantime, endeavoring in cooperation with Moon, who was
on the -ground in front of the airplane, to start the motor so as to warm
it up, and while they were thus engaged the propellor of the airplane struck
Moon on the head causing his death. Suit was brought by the plaintiff
widow to recover damages, she, as administratrix ad prosequendum of de-
cedent's estate, alleging that his death was caused by the negligent starting
of the propellor blade by the defendant Donald Lewis.
The charge of negligence against the defendant Donald Lewis was that
on two occasions he and Moon acting in concert attempted to start the motor
by the "compression" method and this having failed, Moon thereupon de-
termined to resort to the "contact" method and that while he had given
Lewis the signal for the "contact" method, which required Moon to reach up
and take hold of the propeller blade, and while he was in the act of doing so,
Lewis instead of following the signal, negligently, and while Moon was in
a position of danger, resorted again without warning to the "compression"
method and succeeded in starting the motor causing the propeller to turn
and strike Moon as he was reaching for it. Plaintiff's only witness, a stu-
dent mechanic at the airport, signed a written statement previous to the
trial which, if allowed in evidence, would have substantiated the allegations
of the complaint. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the witness contradicted
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this statement at the trial and the court refused to admit it in evidence.
There was no other testimony from which the jury could find or infer
negligence. Judgment of nonsuit was entered in favor of the defendants
in the Union Circuit of the Supreme Court. Held: on appeal, affirmed. A
written statement by a witness, which he contradicted at the trial, cannot be
used as evidence of negligence; it can be used only to neutralize the effect
of the testimony of the witness at the trial. Therefore even assuming, with-
out deciding, that it was error to refuse to admit the statement in evidence,
yet it was harmless error and not sufficient grounds for reversal. Mary C.
Moon, Admrx. ad prosequendum, Estate of Vernie E. Moon v. Nathan E.
Lewis, - N. J. -, 235 C. C. H. 1211. (New Jersey Court of Errors and
Appeals, decided May 14, 1936).
